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How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and
fiscal policies? Andwhat do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government
debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy
model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal
authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor
income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government
debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse
incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabiliza-
tion response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to
larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce
government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using
first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively
significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements
are largely unpredictable in nature.
& 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Following the recent financial crisis and the ensuing ‘Great Recession’, governments in many OECD economies have
implemented expansionary fiscal policy measures in addition to offering rescue packages of unprecedented size to the
financial sector. These decisions have lead to a considerable increase in the level of government indebtedness, triggering for
some countries even fears about the sustainability of public finances. Fig. 1 illustrates this fact by depicting the evolution of
the central governments’ liabilities in relation to GDP for a selected group of OECD economies. Debt levels strongly increased
over the period 2007–2009 and theOECD forecasts for the years 2010 and 2011 show that debt levels are expected to increase
even further.
These developments raise the important question which normative implications follow from the large build-up of
government debt for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in the future? Should stabilization attempts in the future
depend on the fact that government debt is higher now? Is it optimal to keep government debt at these elevated levels or
should it be reduced over time? To provide an answer, the present paper analyzes a stylized dynamic equilibriummodel and
determines how the optimal conduct ofmonetary andfiscal policy depends on the level of accumulated government debt and
how debt evolves under such optimal policies.
The paper considers three government instruments that are generally considered relevant for the conduct of stabilization
policy, namely (1) monetary policy defined as control of the short-term nominal interest rate, (2) fiscal policy in the form ofll rights reserved.
ll as to Viktor Winschel, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the European University
onference 2010. All errors remain mine.
Fig. 1. Central government debt/GDP: history and OECD forecast.
Source: OECD World Economic outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Table 33.
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government debt as means to finance current expenditure, where government debt is assumed to be nominal and non-state
contingent.1 The paper determines how these tools should be used as stabilization instruments in response to technology
shocks and how this should depend on the level of outstanding government debt. In addition, it determines how the
government debt level evolves under optimal monetary and fiscal policies.
The economic environment considered in this paper features three important distortions. First, firms are assumed to
possess monopoly power in product markets which allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal cost. This causes output
to generally fall short of its first best level. Second, fiscal policy has to use distortionary labor income taxes to finance public
goods provision and interest payments on outstanding government debt. Public spending and government debt thus have
additional adverse labor supply and output effects. Finally, nominal rigidities in the price of final goods prevent prices from
fully adjusting in response to economic disturbances and policy measures.2
Each of these distortions has important implications for the optimal conduct of policy. Firms’monopoly power and the fact
that the government can levy only distortionary income taxesmake it optimal to reduce government spending belowwhat is
suggested by the first best allocation rule for public and private consumption. It is thereby optimal to reduce public goods
provision more, the higher is the outstanding government debt/GDP ratio.
Furthermore, as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), nominal rigidities prevent the government from using price level
changes as an important source of state-contingent taxation in the presence of nominal government debt. As a result,
government debt optimally follows anear randomwalk, as in Barro (1979) andAiyagari et al. (2002).However, unlike in these
latter papers, the standarddeviations of the innovation to this near randomwalk crucially depends on the level of outstanding
government debt. This result emerges because the present paper considers a model in which technology shocks are the
underlying driving force. Such shocks give rise to variations in the tax base and these have larger fiscal budget implications
the larger is the labor tax rate, i.e., the higher is the outstanding amount of government debt.3
The fact that larger government debt gives rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to the tax rate has important
implications for optimal debt dynamics. In particular, it provides incentives to reduce government debt over time so as to
reduce budget risk (provided the initial debt level is positive). As a result, debt dynamics deviate from randomwalk behavior
in a second-order approximation to optimal policy. The quantitative strength of this force can be significant, e.g., it can be
optimal to reduce the debt/GDP ratio by about 0.6% each year, but this depends onwhether or not the variance of technology
shocks is largely due to predictable or unpredictable movements. Unpredictable components thereby provide stronger
incentives for debt reduction.
In the present setting, which considers homothetic preferences over public and private consumption, debt optimally
increases if its initial level is negative and optimally decreases if the initial level is positive. When initial government debt is
zero, this turns out to be an absorbing state (to second-order accuracy). Specifically,without outstanding debt, it is optimal to
balance any revenue shortfall from an adverse technology shock exclusively through a corresponding reduction in
government spending. Tax rates and debt then remain unchanged in response to shocks. This suggests that debt optimally
reverts to zero over time.
The economicmodel in this paper is related to earlierwork byAdamandBilli (2008, 2009). It extends these earlier settings
by allowing for distortionary income taxation and for government debt dynamics at the same time. Moreover, it considers
fully optimal stabilization policieswhile previousworkwas concernedwith time-consistent (or discretionary) policymaking
and the design of institutions that would allow overcoming the distortions generated by the lack of commitment.1 Muchof the public finance literature treats the government spendingprocess as exogenous,which is hard to understand fromanormative perspective.
Exceptions are Adam and Billi (2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007), or Leith et al. (2009).
2 Nominal rigidities, however, also allow monetary policy to affect real interest rates and thereby the real allocations in the economy.
3 In Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002) government spending is assumed exogenous and spending shocks are the only source of randomness, so that
fiscal budget risks are largely independent from the government debt level.
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summarizing optimal private sector behavior. After determining the first best allocation in Section 3, Section 4 describes the
optimal policy problem and the numerical solution strategy. It also derives analytical results regarding the deterministic
steady state outcomes associated with optimal monetary and fiscal policy. The quantitative implication of government debt
for the steady state outcomes is analyzed in Section 5, while Section 6 determines the impulse responses of the economy to
technology shocks and shows how these depend on the outstanding level of government debt. Section 7 discusses the
implications for the optimal drift of government debt over time and shows that the quantitative implications arising from
budget risk considerations can be sizable. Section 8 discusses how results change if government spending cannot adjust in
response to technology shocks. A conclusion summarizes.
2. Description of the economic model
The next sections adapt the sticky pricemodel presented in Adamand Billi (2008) to the empiricallymore relevant setting
withdistortionary income taxes and credible governmentdebt. Besides presenting themodel ingredients, this sectionderives
the implementability constraints characterizing optimal private sector behavior, i.e., derives the optimality conditions
determining households’ consumption and labor supply decisions and firms’ price setting decisions.
2.1. Private sector
There is a continuum of identical households with preferences given by
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
btuðct ,ht ,gtÞ
" #
ð1Þ
where ct denotes consumption of an aggregate consumption good, ht 2 ½0,1 denotes the labor supply, and gt public goods
provision by the government in the form of aggregate consumption goods. Throughout the paper we impose the following
conditions:
Condition 1. u(c,h,g) is separable in c, h, and g, and uc40, ucco0, uho0, uhhr0, ug40, uggo0.
Each household produces a differentiated intermediate good. Demand for that good is given by
ytd
~Pt
Pt
 !
where yt denotes (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, ~Pt is the price of the good produced by the household,
and Pt is the price of the aggregate good. The demand function dðÞ satisfies
dð1Þ ¼ 1
@d
@ð ~Pt=PtÞ
ð1Þ ¼ Z
where Z 2 ð1,1Þ is the price elasticity of demand for the differentiated goods. Importantly, the previously stated
assumptions about the demand function are consistent with optimizing individual behavior when private and public
consumption goods areDixit–Stiglitz aggregates of the goods producedby different households, see AdamandBilli (2008) for
details.
The household chooses ~Pt and then hires the necessary amount of labor ~ht to satisfy the resulting product demand, i.e.,
zt ~ht ¼ ytd
~Pt
Pt
 !
ð2Þ
where zt is an aggregate technology shock which evolves according to
ztþ1 ¼ ð1rzÞþrzztþez,tþ1
with
ez,tþ1  iiNð0,s2Þ
Following Rotemberg (1982)we introduce sluggish nominal price adjustment by assuming that firms face quadratic resource
costs for adjusting prices according to
y
2
~Pt
~Pt1
1
 !2
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PtctþBt ¼ Rt1Bt1þPt
~Pt
Pt
ytd
~Pt
Pt
 !
wt ~ht
y
2
~Pt
~Pt1
1
 !224
3
5þPtwthtð1ttÞ ð3Þ
where Bt denotes nominal government bonds that pay BtRt in period t+1, wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor
market, and tt is a labor income tax.4
Although nominal government bonds are the only available financial instrument, adding complete financial markets for
claims between households would make no difference for the analysis: since households have identical incomes in a
symmetric price setting equilibrium, there exists no incentive to actually trade such claims. One should note that we also
abstract from money holdings. This should be interpreted as the ‘cashless limit’ of an economy with money, see Woodford
(1998). Money thus imposes only a lower bound on the gross nominal interest rate, i.e.,
RtZ1 ð4Þ
each period. Abstracting from money entails that we ignore seigniorage revenues generated in the presence of positive
nominal interest rates. Given the size of these revenues in relation to GDP in industrialized economies, this does not seem to
be an important omission for the analysis conducted here.5
Finally, we impose a no-Ponzi scheme constraint on household behavior, i.e.,
lim
j-1
Et
Ytþ j1
i ¼ 0
1
Ri
 !
Btþ j
" #
Z0 ð5Þ
The household’s problem consists of choosing state-contingent processes fct ,ht , ~ht , ~Pt ,Btg1t ¼ 0 so as tomaximize (1) subject
to (2), (3), and (5) taking as given fyt ,Pt ,wt ,Rt ,gt ,ttg1t ¼ 0 as well as the exogenous stochastic productivity process fztg1t ¼ 0.
Using Eq. (2) to substitute ~ht in (3) and letting the Lagrangemultiplier on (3) be given by b
tlt=Pt , the first-order conditions
of the household’s problem are then Eqs. (2), (3), and (5) holding with equality and also
uc,t ¼ lt ð6Þ
uh,t ¼ltwtð1ttÞ ð7Þ
lt ¼ bEt ltþ1
Rt
Ptþ1
 
ð8Þ
0¼ lt ytdðrtÞþrtytduðrtÞ
wt
zt
ytduðrtÞy Pt
rt
rt1
1
 
Pt
rt1
 
þbyEt ltþ1
rtþ1
rt
Ptþ11
 
rtþ1
r2t
Ptþ1
 
ð9Þ
where
rt ¼
~Pt
Pt
denotes the relative price. Furthermore, there is the transversality constraint
lim
j-1
Et b
tþ juc,tþ j
Btþ j
Ptþ j
 
¼ 0 ð10Þ
which has to hold at each contingency.
2.2. Government
The government consists of two authorities. First, there is amonetary authority which controls the nominal interest rates
on short-termnominal bonds through openmarket operations. Sincewe consider a cashless limit economy, the openmarket
operations are infinitesimally small allowing us to abstract from seigniorage revenue. Second, there is a fiscal authority
deciding on the level of government expenditures, labor income taxes and on debt policy. Government expenditures consist
of spending for the provision of public goods gt and for interest payments on outstanding debt. The level of public goods
provision is a choice variable of the government. The governmentfinances current expenditures by raising labor income taxes
and by issuing new debt, so that its budget constraint is given by
Bt
Pt
þttwtht ¼ gtþ
Rt1
Pt
Bt1
Pt1
ð11Þ
The government can credibly commit to repay its debt and government debt is assumed to be nominal and not state-
contingent, consistent with the type of debt typically issued by governments around the globe. These features imply,4 Considering instead income or consumption taxes are equivalent to a labor income tax plus a lump sum tax (on profits).
5 As emphasized by Leeper (1991), however, seigniorage may nevertheless be an important marginal source of revenue.
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policy of monetary authority influences directly the nominal return the government has to offer on its instruments; second,
nominal interest rate decisions also affect the price level and thereby the real value of outstanding government debt. Thus, to
the extent that themonetary policy can affect the real interest rate or the price level, itwill affect the government budget, as is
the case in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2008). In what follows we assume that government debt and tax policies are such that the
no-Ponzi constraint (5) and the transversality constraint (10) are both satisfied.2.3. Rational expectations equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibriumthe relative price is givenby rt=1 for all t. The private sectors’ optimality conditions can thenbe
condensed into a (non-linear) Phillips curve
uc,tðPt1ÞPt ¼
uc,tzt
y
ht 1þZþ
uh,t
uc,tð1ttÞ
Z
zt
 
þbEt½uc,tþ1ðPtþ11ÞPtþ1 ð12Þ
and a consumption Euler equation
uc,t ¼ bEt uc,tþ1
Rt
Ptþ1
 
ð13Þ
Using (6) and (7) and defining
bt ¼
Bt
Pt
the government budget constraint can be expressed as
bt
tt
1tt
uh,t
uc,t
ht ¼ gtþ
Rt1
Pt
bt1 ð14Þ
Definition 1 (Rational expectations equilibrium). Given the initial outstanding debt level (R1b1), a rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) consists of a sequence of government policies fRtZ1,tt ,gt ,btg1t ¼ 0 and private sector choices fct ,ht ,Ptg1t ¼ 0
satisfying Eqs. (12) and (13), the market clearing condition
ctþ
y
2
ðPt1Þ2þgt ¼ ztht , ð15Þ
the government budget constraint (14), the no-Ponzi constraint (5), and the transversality condition (10).3. First best allocation
The first best allocation, which takes into account only household preferences and the constraints imposed by the
production technology, satisfies
ug,t ¼ uc,t ¼
uh,t
zt
which shows that it is optimal to equate themarginal utilities of private and public consumption to themarginal disutility of
work, where the latter is scaled by labor productivity. This simple allocation rule is optimal because it is equally costly to
produce the public and the private consumption goods.4. Optimal monetary and fiscal policy
This section describes the monetary and fiscal policy problem. It is important to note that—due to the existence of a
number of important economic distortions—policy can generally not achieve the first best allocation determined in the
previous section. First, market power by firms generally implies that wages fall short of their marginal product, so that labor
supply and therefore output is too low relative to the optimal allocation.6 Second, the requirement to finance government
expenditure and interest payments on outstanding government debtwith distortionary income taxes additionally depresses
labor supply and output. Third, the presence of nominal rigidities may prevent the price system from providing the
appropriate scarcity signals.Monetary andfiscal policywill seek tominimize the effects of all these distortions. Aswewill see
below, this will involve reducing government consumption below its first best level so as to reduce the averse labor supply
consequences of income taxes.6 This assumes non-negative income tax rates, as are required when government debt is non-negative.
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max
fct ,ht ,Pt ,Rt Z1,tt ,gt ,Bt=Ptg1t ¼ 0
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
btuðct ,ht ,gtÞ
" #
s:t: : Eqs: ð12Þ2ð15Þ for all t
R1b1 given ð16Þ
The Lagrangian of the problem is
max
fct ,ht ,Pt ,Rt Z1,tt ,gt ,btg1t ¼ 0
min
fg1t ,g2t ,g3t ,g4t g1t ¼ 0
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
btuðct ,ht ,gtÞ
þbtg1t
uc,tðPt1ÞPt
uc,tzt
y
ht 1þZþ
uh,t
uc,tð1ttÞ
Z
zt
 
buc,tþ1ðPtþ11ÞPtþ1
0
B@
1
CA
þbtg2t
uc,t
Rt
buc,tþ1
Ptþ1
 
þbtg3t zthtct
y
2
ðPt1Þ2gt
 
þbtg4t bt
tt
1tt
uh,t
uc,t
htgt
Rt1
Pt
bt1
 
2
6666666666666666666664
3
7777777777777777777775
ð17Þ
The first order necessary conditions for the Lagrangian problem are derived in Appendix A.1. The appendix shows that the
non-linear solution to these FOCs take the form
yt ¼ gðxt ,sÞ ð18Þ
where yt ¼ ðct ,ht ,Pt ,Rt ,tt ,gt ,g1t ,g2t ,g3t ,g4t Þ denote the decision variables and xt ¼ ðzt ,m1t ,m2t ,bt1,Rt1Þ the state variables. The
parameters in the function (18) indicates that the solutiondepends on the standarddeviation of the technology shockss. The
state variables xt evolve according to
ztþ1 ¼ mzþrzztþaz,0ez,tþ1 ð19Þ
m1tþ1 ¼ g1t ð20Þ
m2tþ1 ¼ g2t ð21Þ
bt ¼ tt
1tt
uh,t
uc,t
htþgtþ Rt1Pt
bt1 ð22Þ
Rt ¼ Rt ð23Þ
The states mit (i=1,2) denote the lagged Lagrange multipliers associated with the forward-looking constraints in (17). At time
zero, these states assume initial valuesmi0 ¼ 0 (i=1,2). As iswell known, this gives rise to transitory non-stationary components
in the solution to the optimal policy problem, even in the absence of shocks. Specifically, in the initial period the policymaker
may find it optimal to generate ‘surprise’ inflation so as to erode the real value of any outstanding government debt. Likewise,
the policymaker may find it optimal to transitorily increase taxes. In what follows, I abstract from these non-stationary
deterministic components of optimal policy and focus instead on the time-invariant deterministic long-run outcome. This
outcomewill be called the Ramsey steady state. Technically, time-invariance canbe achievedby setting the time zero values of
mi0 (i=1,2) equal to their steady state value rather than to zero. Economically, this amounts to impose an initial commitment on
the policymaker not to generate ‘surprise’movements in taxes, government spending, or nominal interest rates in period zero.
This is standard practice in the optimal taxation literature, e.g., Chari et al. (1991). Implicitly, I also impose the constraint that
the policymaker at time t=0 is required to repay the outstanding debt R1b1. As will be shown below, this constraint is
binding; without this constraint it would be optimal to default on the inherited debt level at time t=0.4.1. Deterministic steady state: analytical results
The model possesses a continuum of deterministic Ramsey steady states, each of which is associated with a different
level of government debt.7 To see this note that the first-order condition with respect to bonds from the optimal policy7 The different deterministic steady states also imply different values for the initial state variables mi0, as explained in the previous sections. This is the
case because the incentives to generate ‘surprise’ movements in policy vary with the initial debt level.
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0¼ g4tbEtg4tþ1
Rt
Ptþ1
In a deterministic steady state, the Euler equation (13) implies
R
P
¼ b1
so that the first-order condition for bonds stated above imposes no restrictions on the deterministic steady state outcomes:
there exists an indeterminacy of dimension one.
Despite the existence of a continuum of deterministic steady states, these steady states share a number of common
properties. As shown in Appendix A.3 all deterministic Ramsey steady states satisfy
P¼ 1 ð24Þ
R¼ b1 ð25Þ
Eq. (24) shows that it is optimal to implement price stability in the absence of shocks. This holds independently of the level of
outstanding government debt and shows that it is suboptimal to use inflation in steady statewith the objective to reduce the
real value of outstanding government debt. Eq. (25) gives the nominal interest rate consistentwith price stability. From bo1
it follows that nominal interest rates are positive.
Using the steady state real interest rate derived above, the steady state government budget constraint can be written as
ttwtht ¼ gtþ ~x ð26Þ
with ~x given by
~x ¼ ðb11Þb
and denoting the interest rate payments on outstanding government debt. From an economic point of view, interest
payments involve just income redistribution, but in an environment with distortionary taxation such redistribution is costly
to provide and has real consequences. It is through this channel that government debt affects the optimal allocations.
Appendix A.3 shows that is optimal to set
uhrug ð27Þ
with a strict inequality if government debt is positive (or at least not too negative). Eq. (27) demonstrates that it is optimal to
reduce public spending to a level below that suggested by consumer preferences and technology, i.e., below the first best
allocation rule determined in Section 3. The economic rationale for restraining spending on public goods provision can be
seen from the following equation which is also derived in Appendix A.3:
uh ¼
1þZ
Z 
gþ ~x
h
 
uc ð28Þ
It shows that there exists a wedge between the marginal utility of (private) consumption and the disutility of labor that
depends on the steady state interest payments ~x.8 Thewedge thereby consists of two components: first, themonopoly power,
which leads to the price mark-up ð1þZÞ=Z; second, the need to finance public expenditure and interest rate payments
through distortionary taxation, which gives rise to the additional term in Eq. (28). Reducing public spending below its first
best level, as suggested by Eq. (27), reduces the required labor tax rates and therefore helps reducing the overall wedge
between themarginal utility of private consumption and themarginal utility of leisure. This suggests that in an economywith
a higher stock of real government debt, i.e. a higher ~x, the incentives to reduce public consumptionbelow its first best level are
stronger (ceteris paribus), simply because taxes are high already due to the high interest burden.
Interestingly, Eq. (28) shows that the steady state distortions could be entirely eliminated if the government had
accumulated a sufficiently large amount of claims against the private sector, so that interest income allows to (1) offset the
monopoly distortions via negative labor income tax rates and (2) to pay for (the first best level of) public goods provision.
4.2. Numerical solution and model calibration
This section explains how one can determine locally approximate solutions for the optimal policies of the stochastic
version of themodel. Since there exists a continuum of deterministic steady states, one has to exogenously choose one of the
steady state dimensions. This is done by fixing the initial real value of outstanding government bonds b1 inherited from
the past (which may be negative in case the government has accumulated claims against the private sector).9 One can
then determine the steady state values for the remaining variables that solve the system of first-order conditions of8 This is true whenever ~x is not too negative, i.e., whenever the government has not accumulated a too high level of claims against the private sector.
9 One alsoneeds to set the nominal interest rate that has beenpromised on the initial outstandingdebt level. Since only b1R1matters for the economic
outcomes, one can set without loss of generality R1 ¼ b1.
Table 1
Baseline calibration.
Parameter definition Assigned value
Quarterly discount factor b¼ 0:9913
Price elasticity of demand Z¼6
Degree of price stickiness y¼ 17:5
1/elasticity of labor supply j¼ 1
Utility weight on labor effort oh ¼ 19:792
Utility weight on public goods og ¼ 0:2656
Technology shock process persistence rz ¼ 0:95
Quarterly s.d. technology shock innovation s¼ 0:6%
K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–7464problem (17).10 Finally, one can determine first- and second-order accurate approximations to the optimal non-linear policy
functions (18) and the state transition equations (40)–(44) using perturbation techniques. Details of the procedure are
provided in Appendix A.2.
For the numerical exercises the following preference specification is considered, which satisfies Condition 1 and is
consistent with balanced growth
uðct ,ht ,gtÞ ¼ logðctÞoh
h1þjt
1þj þoglogðgtÞ ð29Þ
withoh40,ogZ0 and the parameterjZ0 denoting the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Themodel is calibrated
as summarized in Table 1, following Adam and Billi (2008). The quarterly discount factor is chosen to match the average ex-
post U.S. real interest rate, 3.5%, during the period 1983:1–2002:4. The value for the elasticity of demand implies a gross
mark-up equal to 1.2. The elasticity of labor effort is assumed to be one (j¼ 1) and the values ofoh andog are chosen such
that in the deterministic Ramsey steady state without government debt, agents work 20% of their time and it is optimal to
spend 20% of total output on public goods. A.4 provides details on how the parameters have to be chosen to achieve this. The
price stickiness parameter is selected such that the log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (12) is consistent with the
estimates of Sbordone (2002), as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). The quarterly standard deviation of the technology
shocks is 0.6% and the shocks have a quarterly persistence equal to rz ¼ 0:95.5. Steady state implications of government debt
This section explores the quantitative implications of different government debt levels for the deterministic steady state
outcomes and steady state welfare.While the qualitative implications have been discussed in Section 4.1, this section shows
that government debt gives rise to quantitatively important steady state effects.
Using the calibration from the previous section, Table 2 reports the steady state outcomes for private consumption, hours
worked, government consumption and taxes for alternative initial debt levels. The last column of the table lists the welfare
equivalent consumption variation that is required each period tomake agents in the zero debt steady state aswell off as in the
considered alternative debt scenarios.11 The outcomes for initial government debt levels equal to 100% and 200% of GDP,
respectively, show that higher debt requires considerably higher income tax rates. These distort downward labor supply and
thereby private consumption. Public consumption also decreases to avoid an even further increase in tax rates. The welfare
implications of debt are large by any conventional standards and amount to 5.6% and 11% of consumption each period,
respectively. This shows that there exist strong incentives for the Ramsey planner to default on the initial level of outstanding
debt R1b1 at time t=0.
The table also reports the steady state outcome under a scenario with large negative government debt. The level of
government claims against the private sector in this scenario is chosen, so that the interest income earned by the government
allows to pay for the first best level of public consumption and to offset the adverse labor supply effects of monopolistic
competition via a negative income tax rate. Such a policy eliminates all steady state distortion in the economy, i.e., achieves
the first best deterministic steady state allocation. This gives rise to a welfare increase of 70% of consumption each period.
Monopoly power by firms and the requirement to raise government revenue through distortionary income taxes thus give
rise to large distortions in the economy, even in a setting where government debt is zero.10 This assumes that themaximum tax revenue that can be raised according to themodel’s Laffer curve is sufficient to pay for the interest payments the
assumed outstanding debt level, see the discussion in the next section.
11 Let (cZ,hZ,gZ) denote the allocation in the zero debt steady state and (cA,hA,gA) the allocation in some alternative steady state. The table reports the
percent increase in consumption v making the zero debt steady state welfare equivalent to the alternative steady state, i.e.,
logðcZð1þvÞÞoh
h1þjZ
1þj þog logðgZÞ ¼ logðcAÞoh
h1þjA
1þj þog logðgAÞ
Table 2
Steady state effects of government debt.
Priv. cons. Hours Gov. cons. Taxes Welfare equiv. cons.
variation (%)
(c) (h) (g) ðtÞ
Zero debt 0.16 0.2 0.04 24% 0.00
100% debt/GDP 0.1558 0.1944 0.0386 28.0% 5.58
Change wrt zero debt 2.61% 2.78% 3.47% +16.8%
200% debt/GDP 0.1516 0.1888 0.0372 32.0% 11.0
Change wrt zero debt 5.25% 5.62% 7.02% +33.3%
First best steady state
1076% debt/GDP 0.2 0.2530 0.0530 20% +70.6
Change wrt zero debt +25% +26.5% +32.5% n.a.
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Fig. 2. Steady state tax rates.
K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–74 65Overall, the effects of different steady state debt/GDP ratios on the allocations and tax rates are surprisingly linear. Fig. 2
provides as an example for this outcome and depicts the optimal steady state tax rate as a function of the steady state
debt/GDP ratio. The linearity emerges even though the model features an important non-linearity resulting from the Laffer
curve. Fig. 4 shows the steady state tax revenue as a function of the debt/GDP ratio (which Fig. 2 shows to be close to linearly
related to the tax rate). At some point, tax revenue ceases to increasewith the tax rate, implying that there exists amaximum
sustainable deterministic steady state debt/GDP ratio. For the baseline calibration this level lies just above 1000% of GDP.
Despite the existence of a Laffer curve, optimal taxes increase only about linearly with the debt/GDP ratio because
government consumption optimally falls (approximately linearly) as the debt/GDP ratio increases.
The same approximate linearity holds true for the consumption equivalent welfare losses, which are shown in Fig. 3. The
convexity of the utility function implies, however, that the utility gains from consumption increases are somewhat smaller
than the utility gains from consumption losses. The relationship between the debt/GDP ratio and steady state utility is thus
convex, with increasing convexity at high debt/GDP ratios.
6. Stabilization policy and budget risks from government debt
This section studies the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response following a technology disturbance and shows how
the optimal stabilization policy depends critically on the initial level of government debt. Specifically, under the optimal
monetary and fiscal policy the government budget is exposed to larger risks from technology shocks, the larger is the
outstanding level of government debt. Since first-order accurate approximations to the optimal stabilization policies abstract
from such risk considerations, first-order approximations miss an important aspect of the truly optimal stabilization policy
and wrongly predict debt to evolve like a random walk.
Fig. 5 illustrates that the level of government debt has important implications for the conduct of stabilization policy and
for the evolution of government debt. The figure reports the dynamics implied by optimal policy around two alternative
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Fig. 3. Steady state welfare implications of government debt.
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–7466deterministic Ramsey steady states, onewhere the initial level of government debt level is zero and onewhere it equals 100%
of GDP. Fig. 5 depicts the first-order accurate impulse responses to a large negative technology shock.12 The shock size equals
three unconditional standard deviations and implies that technology temporarily drops by about 5.7%, thereafter slowly
reverts to steady state.13
Under both debt scenarios, output, private and public consumption all drop by about the same amount as technology.14
Notable differences across the two scenarios emerge, however, when considering the optimal responses of inflation, nominal
interest rates, taxes, and government debt.
When government debt is zero, there is no response of inflation, taxes or debtwhatsoever. The reasons is that it is optimal
to offset the reduction in tax revenue resulting from the negative technology shock by a corresponding reduction in
government spending. This feature is a result of the assumed homotheticity of the utility functionwith respect to private and
public consumption. It implies that in the absence of outstanding government debt, technology shocks do not give rise to
uncertainty about future debt and taxes (up to first-order accuracy).15 Technology shocks thus do not give rise to government
‘budget risks’ under the optimal stabilization policy.12 The second-order effects are discussed in the next section.
13 The assumed shock process implies that the economy spends less that 0.13% of the quarters in states with such or worse technology levels.
14 The response is slightly more muted because the negative wealth effect of technology shocks implies that labor supply expands somewhat.
15 This continues to be true when looking at second-order accurate impulse responses in the next section.
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–74 67The situation differs notably when government debt is positive. With positive debt levels, it is suboptimal to offset the
drop in tax revenue following an adverse technology shocks entirely by a corresponding reduction in government spending.
This is so because large part of the steady state tax revenue is used to pay interest on debt, so that an enormous government
spending reduction would be required to balance the budget. This is suboptimal because the marginal utility of government
consumption is very high since the steady state level of government spending is low at high debt levels, see the discussion in
Section 5.While government spending fallsmore on impactwhendebt is high, the reduction is still insufficient to balance the
budget. The government is thus forced to issue additional debt and to increase taxes tofinance it. As a result, thedebt level and
the tax rate move permanently higher. This is an example of Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing result, but emerging here in a
setting with endogenous spending decisions, endogenous interest rates and following a technology disturbance. With a
positive amount of government debt, technology shocks thus give risk to government ‘budget risks’ under the optimal
stabilization policy, i.e., future debt and tax paths are uncertain and depend on the shock realizations.
Interestingly, when government debt is positive, it also becomes optimal to lower nominal interest rates on impact rather
than increasing them, as would be optimal in the absence of government debt. This reduces real interest rates and implies a
less severe collapse in output and consumption than otherwise in the first period. It also generates some small amount of
inflation,which helps to reduce the real value ofmaturing government debt. Yet, as is known from thework of Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2004), it is suboptimal in the presence of even small amounts of nominal rigidities to bring about large price level
changes, i.e., to use nominal bonds as a state contingent source of taxation. This finding shows up here in the form of rather
small movements of inflation following a fairly large sized shock.
The first-order accurate impulse response dynamics depicted in Fig. 5 show that the larger the amount of outstanding
government debt, the larger are the ‘budget risks’ associated with technology shocks. Therefore, although up to first-order
accuracy, the government debt/GDP ratio evolves locally like a randomwalk, the fact that budget risk increaseswith the debt
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–7468level should provide incentives to reduce government debt over time in the presence of shocks.16 This issue is investigated in
the next section, which analyzes the second-order accurate optimal equilibrium dynamics.7. Optimal debt dynamics
This section evaluates to what extent the ‘budget risk’ associated with outstanding government debt documented in the
previous section provides incentives to reduce government debt over time. To capture the optimal policy implications arising
from budget risk considerations, this section considers a second-order accurate approximation to optimal policy and the
implied debt/GDP dynamics.17
As before, consideration is restricted to a local analysis around some pre-specified deterministic Ramsey steady state. The
analysis thus ignores the incentives for debt reduction arising from global constraints such as borrowing constraints. As
shown in Aiyagari et al. (2002), such global constraints can provide additional incentives for debt reduction. The point here is
to show that potentially important incentives for debt reduction exist evenwhen restricting consideration to a local analysis.
Fig. 6 depicts the optimal drift in the debt/GDP ratio as a function of assumed steady state debt/GDP ratio. Specifically, the
figure reports the constant in the state transition law for bonds emerging from a second-order accurate approximate solution
to optimalmonetary and fiscal policy using the baseline parameterization, and scales this constant by the GDP level. It shows
that there is a tendency for debt to fall whenever it is positive and to increase whenever it is negative. This suggests that over
time debt optimally converges to zero.18
Quantitatively, the drift term turns out not to be very large in the baseline parameterization. This finding is fairly robust tomany
parameter changes, except when the unpredictable components of technology shocks increase. To illustrate this finding, Fig. 7
depicts the optimal debt drift under less persistent technology shock processes. The standard deviation of the innovation to the
technology process is thereby adjusted so as to keep the overall unconditional standard deviation of technology shocks unchanged
when compared to thebaseline specification. As thefigure shows, itmay thenbeoptimal to reduce thedebt toGDP ratio by asmuch
as 0.6% per year. This shows that second-order effects can easily become quantitatively significant.
Fig. 8 illustrates this factbycomparing thefirst- andsecond-orderaccurate impulse responses toanegative technologyshock.19 It
shows that important differences emerge between a first and second order accurate approximation of the optimal response of taxes
and government debt. Especially, the optimal evolution of government debt deviates significantly from random walk behavior.
Interestingly, the optimal speed of the debt drift in Figs. 6 and 7 is non-monotone in the initial debt/GDP ratio. Specifically,
as the debt/GDP ratio increases, the optimal speed of debt reduction first rises but then falls. It is actually not surprising, that
this relationship can be non-monotone.While budget risk increaseswith the debt level, as shown in the previous section, the
cost of repaying debtmay equally rise, due to the existence of a Laffer curve. The cost of repaymentmay thereby rise faster or
slower than the benefits of repayment, so that the relationship between the debt/GDP ratio and the optimal speed of debt
repayment can be non-monotone.16 In the absence of shocks, it is optimal to hold debt constant over time.
17 The solution approach is explained in Appendix A.2.
18 This differs from the results in Aiyagari et al. (2002)where debt converged to a large negative value.Unlike inAiyagari et al., the present setupdoes not
allow for lump sum rebates of government revenue.
19 The assumed shock persistence is rz ¼ 0:5. As before, the standard deviation of the technology shock innovation is adjusted so as to keep the
unconditional standard deviation of technology shocks unchanged compared to the baseline parameterization.
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–74 69Figs. 6 and 7 also show that for sufficiently negative debt levels the government actually reduces the speed at which it
decumulates its claims against the private sector. While budget risk increases as debt becomes more negative, the utility
consequences of any given amount of risk also decrease. This is so because utility is flat locally with respect to tax changes at
thepointwhere the government holds just enough claims allowing it to implement thefirst best equilibrium in the absence of
shocks. As a result, the optimal speed of debt increase may be non-monotonically related to the level of claims that the
government has accumulated against the private sector.
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–74708. Optimal debt dynamics with exogenous spending
Most of the public finance literature treats the process for government spending as exogenous.20 Moreover, in some of
thesemodels, exogenous government spending shocks are the only source of randomness, so that budget risk is independent
of the government debt level.21 This section shows that debt-dependent ‘budget risk’ continues to provide incentives for debt
reduction if one allows for technology shocks, even in a setting with an exogenously fixed spending path. Indeed, the
incentives for debt reduction can become even stronger. The analysis in this section is also of interest, because it is
informative about the optimal speed of debt reduction in a setting, where institutional restrictions prevent the government
from adjusting public spending in response to aggregate technology shocks.
Fig. 9 illustrates the effects of exogenously fixing government spending on the optimal debt drift and compares it to the drift
emerging with endogenous spending decisions.22 To make the comparison meaningful, the figure reports for each given
deterministic steady state value of the debt/GDP ratio the drift coefficients that emerge froma second-order approximation of the
two models, assuming that in the model with exogenous spending the level of public consumption is exogenously fixed at the
deterministic steady state value arising in themodel with endogenous spending decisions. The figure thus isolates for each given
level of the debt/GDP ratio the effects of not being able to adjust the government spending level following technology shocks.
The figure shows that the unavailability of the government spending margin provides additional incentives for debt
reduction whenever the government has positive amounts of debt outstanding. This suggest that inertia or exogeneity of
government spendingplans amplifies the optimal speedof debt reduction compared to the situation studied in thepaper thus
far. Also, unlike in the case with endogenous spending, the zero debt steady state ceases to be an absorbing state when
spending is exogenous.23 With zero debt and exogenous spending, technology shocks require an adjustment of taxes and
debt, i.e., give rise to budget risk. As Fig. 9 shows, this provides incentives for the government to accumulate claims against the
private sector.
9. Conclusions
This paper shows that the recent increase in government debt has important implications for the optimal conduct of
monetary and fiscal policy. Higher government debt requires lowering the average level of public spending and exposes fiscal
budgets to increased risks following technology shocks or – more generally – fluctuations in the tax base. These budget risk
considerations can provide quantitatively important incentives to reduce government debt over time, but the optimal speed
of debt reduction is not necessarily monotone in the level of accumulated government debt. As a result, optimal debt
dynamics deviate in important ways from random walk behavior. The results in this paper suggest that debt optimally
converges to zero over time and that the optimal speed of debt reduction tends to increase if governments cannot adjust their
spending plans following fluctuations in the tax base.20 See, for example, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).
21 See, for example, the classic papers by Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002).
22 The figure assumes rz ¼ 0:5. As before, the standard deviation of the technology shock innovation is adjusted to keep the unconditional standard
deviation of technology shocks unchanged compared to the baseline parameterization.
23 With endogenous spending this is true up to second order of accuracy.
K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–74 71Foranumberof reasons, thepresentpapermayhave significantlyunderstated theoptimal speedofdebt reduction. First, global
inequality constraints, such as the borrowing limit implied by the Laffer curve, may provide additional incentives for debt
reduction. Taking this constraint into account requires solving the model fully non-linearly, along the lines of Adam and Billi
(2006). This appears to be an interesting task for future research. Second, the present paper focused exclusively on technology
shocks. Other shocks, e.g., shocks to agentsa’ discount factors give rise to additional sources of budget risk, as they move the real
interest rates atwhich thegovernment can refinance its outstandingdebt. Exploring thequantitative relevanceof such alternative
disturbances for the optimal speed of debt reduction appears to be an equally interesting task for future research.Appendix A
A.1. FOCs and solution strategy
The first-order conditions of problem (17) with respect to the decision variables ðct ,ht ,Pt ,Rt ,tt ,gt ,btÞ are
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gt : 0¼ ug,tg3tg4t ð35Þ
bt : 0¼ g4tbEtg4tþ1
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The derivatives with respect to the first three Lagrange multipliers are given by
uc,tðPt1ÞPt
uc,tzt
y
ht 1þZþ
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uc,tð1ttÞ
Z
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 
bEtuc,tþ1ðPtþ11ÞPtþ1 ¼ 0 ð37Þ
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bEt uc,tþ1Ptþ1
¼ 0 ð38Þ
zthtct
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2
ðPt1Þ2gt ¼ 0 ð39Þ
We can then define five state variables and the corresponding five transition equations:
ztþ1 ¼ mzþrzztþaz,0ez,tþ1 ð40Þ
m1tþ1 ¼ g1t ð41Þ
m2tþ1 ¼ g2t ð42Þ
bt ¼
tt
1tt
uh,t
uc,t
htþgtþ
Rt1
Pt
bt1 ð43Þ
Rt ¼ Rt ð44Þ
where the forth equation is the derivative of the Lagrangian (17) with respect to the last multiplier and the mit denote the
lagged Lagrangemultipliers associatedwith the forward-looking constraints in (17). In the last equation, Rt denotes both the
future state variable and the current decision variable. As we show below, optimal policies are going to be a function of these
state variables.
K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–7472The state transition equations (40)–(44), the FOCs (30)–(36), and the implementability constraints (37)–(39) form a
system of five state transition equations and 10 additional equations of the form
Etf ðxtþ1,ytþ1,xt ,ytÞ ¼ 0 ð45Þ
which is of the formanalyzed inGommeandKlein (2010). As argued inGommeandKlein, a non-linear solution to this system
of non-linear expectational difference equations is given by non-linear decision functions of the form
yt ¼ gðxt ,sÞ ð46Þ
where yt ¼ ðct ,ht ,Pt ,Rt ,tt ,gt ,g1t ,g2t ,g3t ,g4t Þ denote the decision variables (note that this list does not contain bt) and where
xt ¼ ðzt ,m1t ,m2t ,bt1,Rt1Þ denotes the state vector. The parameter s thereby denotes the standard deviation of the technology
shock innovation. The non-linear state transition is thereby described by Eqs. (40)–(44).
A.2. Local approximation of optimal dynamics
Let ðx,yÞ denote a deterministic steady state of the non-linear equation system (45) solving
f ðx,y,x,yÞ ¼ 0
A second-order approximation of the non-linear solution (46) around this steady state is given by a decision function
~yt ¼ kyþF ~xtþ
1
2
ðI5  ~xtu ÞE ~xt
and a state transition function
~xtþ1 ¼ kxþP ~xtþ
1
2
ðI10  ~xtu ÞG ~xtþsetþ1
where the tilde indicates that a variable is expressed in terms of deviations from its steady state. The approximation is taken
with respect to the expansion variable s around s¼ 0 and the values for (ky,F,E) and (kx,P,G) can be computed using the code
provided by Gomme and Klein (2010). The first-order accurate dynamics of themodel can be obtained by the same equations
when setting ky,kx,E,G all equal to zero.
A.3. Ramsey steady state
To simplify matters we start by eliminating taxes and the government budget constraint from the Lagrangian (17). Note
that the FOCs (6) and (7) imply
uh,t
uc,t
¼ ð1ttÞwt ¼wtttwt
and from steady state version of the government budget (26) we have
ttwt ¼ gtþ
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Substituting the latter equation into the former gives the following expression for the real wage:
wt ¼
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which allows expressing the Phillips curvewithout reference to taxes. The simplified constant debt version of the Lagrangian
(17) is then
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The FOCs consist of the three constraints and
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We now impose steady state conditions by dropping time subscripts. From (51)
g2 ¼ 0
so that (50) gives
P¼ 1
and from (13) one obtains
R¼ 1
b
Using these results and imposing them on the steady state version of the derivative of (47) with respect to g1t one obtains
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which is Eq. (28) in the main text. Since uho0 and uc40 the previous equation implies
1þZZ gþ ~x
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o0 ð54Þ
In the steady state equations (48), (49) and (52) simplify to
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where g340 denotes the marginal utility of relaxing the resource constraint. The previous FOCs indicate the alternative
possible uses of additional resources, namely private consumption (Eq. (55)), leisure (Eq. (56)) and public consumption
(Eq. (57)). Since public consumption is only one of the three possible uses of resources, it must be the case that g3Zug in the
optimum. Eq. (57) therefore implies that g1Z0. Combining Eqs. (55) and (57) to eliminate g3 then gives
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and since uc4uh, we have ug4uh, as claimed in the main text.A.4. Utility parameters and Ramsey steady state
Here we show how the utility parameters oh and og are determined by the Ramsey steady state values. Let variables
without subscripts denote their steady state values and consider the Ramsey steady state with constant debt from Appendix
A.3. Since P¼ 1 the Phillips curve constraint in (47) implies
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K. Adam / European Economic Review 55 (2011) 57–7474and allows to determine the steady state values of uh and uhh. Adding up Eqs. (55) and (56) then delivers
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